Status-based discrimination (part 1 of 2)

Here are some notes from the article "Getting A Job: Is There A Motherhood Penalty" by Correll and colleagues (2007).

Summary
Employed mothers suffer wage penalty, and the pay gap between mothers and nonmothers is larger than the pay gap between men and women.

Mothers are also perceived as less competent, less committed, less dependable, less authoritative and more irrational.

Explanation for motherhood penalty can be classified into:

• Worker explanations (differences in traits, skills and behaviors between mothers and nonmothers)
• Discrimination explanation (differential preference for or treatment of mothers and nonmothers)

Past research, which have focused on worker or productivity explanations , do not fully account for motherhood penalty.

Some empirical evidence for discrimination explanation exists, but is inconsistent with predictions.

Purpose & hypothesis

To evaluate the hypothesis that cultural status beliefs account for motherhood penalty, at least partially, by leading evaluators to unconsciously perceive that mothers are less competent and less committed.   

Design/Methodology/Approach

Two approaches: Lab study and Audit study; in both studies job relevant qualifications are experimentally held constant for a pair of fictitious applicants.

Lab experiment: Evaluators rate the applicants in terms of perceived competence, workplace commitment, hireability, promotability, and recommended salary.

Audit study: Positive responses to from actual employers applicants based on the number of callbacks are measured.

Theoretical explanation

Based on Status characteristics theory (Berger et al., 1977)

Motherhood is seen as a devalued status in workplace settings

• Cultural beliefs associate motherhood with less ability and less committed to work than nonmothers, and therefore believed to put less effort.
• The conception of “ideal worker”  is seen to be incompatible with the “good mother”  role. This perceived cultural tension is suggested to result in devalued status for motherhood.
• “Good father” is not seen as incompatible with “ideal worker.” They enjoy a “fatherhood premium”

Status-based discrimination

• Since mothers are perceived to be less committed and competent, evaluation decisions (hiring, salary and promotion) are biased against them.
• Mothers are also evaluated by harsher standards than nonmothers.
• Status-based discrimination is different than statistical discrimination . According to status-based discrimination, evaluation standards used is biased in favor of high-status groups. Statistical discrimination, arising from lack of information, assumes evaluators are rational and apply unbiased standards

Findings

Lab study

• Mothers were judged as less competent and committed than nonmothers
• Mothers were held to harsher performance standards
• Recommended starting salary for mothers was $11,000 less than for nonmothers
• Mothers were rated less promotable and less likely to be recommended for management
• Mothers, not fathers and nonmothers, were held to higher ability standards
• Fathers were rated more committed than childless men
• Fathers were offered lower salary than childless men
• Nonmothers were rated more competent than nonfathers
• 84% of nonmothers, but only 47% of nonmothers were recommended for hiring
• Fathers were 1.83 times more likely to be recommended for management than childless men
• Childless women were 8.2 times more likely than mothers to be recommended for management
• No impact of participant gender was found. But female participants held all female applicants to higher standards than male participants did. But they penalized mothers slightly less
• Both African-Americans and white experienced motherhood penalty
• Competence and commitment ratings partially mediate the effect on evaluations

Audit study

• Childless women received 2.1 times as many callbacks as equally qualified mothers.
• Fathers were called back at a higher rate (1.8 times) than equally qualified childless men. But the difference was insignificant.
• Motherhood penalty interaction was significant. This indicates that being a parent lowers the odds of callback for woman as compared to a man.
• Parenthood status was not significant. Therefore, no evidence of fatherhood bonus.
• Female applicant status was significant implying that childless women were significantly more likely to receive a callback than childless men.
• Mothers are disadvantaged in actual job hiring decisions. Since applicant qualification was equivalent, employer discrimination is responsible for disadvantages found.

Limitations

Salience (i.e. parenthood differentiates applicants) is a scope condition for the theoretical explanation provided.

Study evaluated the status-based discrimination mechanism for a high-status job (i.e. midlevel marketing position). Whether similar type and magnitude of discrimination results for low-status or for varying gender-typed jobs is to be explored.

Study examines discrimination only at the point of hire. Whether similar type and magnitude of discrimination occurs at other critical junctures (e.g. promotion, voice in decision making, firing, etc.) in organizational context need to be evaluated.

Study examines only one avenue of applying for job (responding directly to employers’ advertisements). But would discrimination type/magnitude through other channels (e.g. referee) be different is not examined. 

The audit study design could not explain why actual employers discriminate against mothers; Ratings of commitment, competence and performance standards were not possible to be collected from actual employers.

Contributions

Provides converging evidence across two studies that status-based discrimination explains motherhood penalty over a broad range of measures (hiring and salary decision).

Provides explanation for inconsistent effects of motherhood status on dependent measures found in past studies by offering a complete account of status-based discrimination. 

First article to use audit study method to demonstrate that real employers discriminate against mothers in hiring (i.e. established causal mechanism).

Footnotes

1. Becker’s  (1985) work-effort hypothesis proposes that mothers may in fact be less productive at work because they have dissipated their reserve of energy caring for their children
2. Human capital, occupational and household resource variables account for 24% of motherhood penalty (Anderson et al., 2003).
3. One study found no difference in competence ratings between employed fathers and employed mothers (Cuddy et al., 2004); Another found no reliable effects of gender and parental status on perceived applicant’s commitment (Fuegen t al., 2004)
4. "Ideal worker" is seen as committed who drops all else for work, devote greater face time and work late nights or weekends
5. "Good mother" is seen as one who prioritizes meeting needs of children above all else
6. Statistical discrimination: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Statistical_discrimination_(economics)

Reference

Correll, S. J., Benard, S., & Paik, I. (2007). Getting a Job: Is There a Motherhood Penalty? 1. American journal of sociology, 112(5), 1297-1339.

(continue to part 2/2)